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Abstract 
The New Zealand Meat Producers’ Export Control Board, set up in the 1920s, implemented a 
policy of producer control of meat processing facilities to maximise producers’ income by 
restricting foreign investment in New Zealand. Meat Board members were not chosen directly 
by producers but indirectly through an electoral college system. Previous authors have 
suggested that that system isolated Board members from producer interests. This paper 
concludes that in the period after World War II the Board, led by an intransigent chairman, had 
indeed become detached from producers and its policy of producer control operated against 
producer interests.  
 
 
Introduction 
From the 1920s, economic uncertainties for New Zealand’s dominant exports of agricultural 
and pastoral products encouraged governments to set up a series of producer organisations. The 
objective was to organise better exports for the benefit of the whole of New Zealand and to 
provide better security of income for the primary producers themselves. Export of meat was 
one of the key export sectors, and in 1921 meat producers and the government agreed that there 
should be a Meat Producers Export Control Board.1 This was because low overseas prices 
together with increases in farming and transport costs had meant poor returns for producers. It 
was felt that promotion of “public economic welfare” would be best achieved by a board of 
control.2 From the start the board considered that its prime objective should be to control the 
whole of New Zealand’s exported meat so that it yielded the highest net return to the producer.3 
To achieve that objective, the board saw itself as an advocate for meat producers, acting as a 
lobby group towards the New Zealand Government and doing its best to be involved in all key 
governmental discussions on issues affecting the meat industry. Bruce Curtis describes the 
Meat Board’s role as “the champion of farmers.”4 That role was helped by governments using 
the board as an advisory body. In striving for the highest net return, the board interpreted that 
it should be active also in reducing costs both within and external to New Zealand, such as 
transport costs including shipping. Operations of the board and its administrative costs were 
met from a levy charged on all exported meat together with profits from the World War I 
commandeer of New Zealand’s meat by Britain. 
The board controlled shipment of meat by acting as an agent for the producers, thereby 
providing a single, strong, body for negotiating shipping rates, and the board was successful in 
achieving significant reductions.5 The board played an important role in ensuring the quality 
of meat for export by controlling arrangements for grading, handling, pooling, and storage of 
meat as well as through inspection and hygiene control at places such as abattoirs. At first, the 
board dealt only with sheep meat, but its coverage was expanded gradually to include beef, 
canned and processed meat, game meat, and fish. One formal function of the board was to 
control export through the issue of export licences; export without the approval of the board 
was prohibited. Curtis reports that that role was included to maintain producers’ control of the 
processing facilities in New Zealand.6 Following the upheaval of the “commandeer” of meat 
for Britain during World War I, there was an increasing threat that freezing works would be 
taken over by overseas meat processing companies (Vesteys, Swift, Borthwicks), who were 
well established globally through their connections with the US, British, Argentinian and 
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Australian meat industries. Curtis describes how those companies operated to the detriment of 
farmers, especially in the USA and Argentina.7 Until World War I, New Zealand freezing 
factories were farmer-owned, and that was thought to maximise the return to farmers. The Meat 
Board was set up partly to defend that arrangement, and at the start of 1940 most freezing 
companies remained New Zealand-owned. Fear of dominance by overseas companies 
remained twenty years after formation of the Meat Board: Mr K. W. J. Hall summarised 
farmers’ fears when he told the North Canterbury executive of the Farmers Union in 1943 that 
he should be sorry if any of those [overseas] companies got a hold here. They would 
be working for themselves and not for us. It is their single aim to get cheap meat into 
the United Kingdom market. We know where we are with our own firms.8 
 
During World War II, the government’s internal marketing department took over the 
marketing of meat when Britain placed bulk contracts for purchasing the whole of New 
Zealand’s exportable surplus.9 At that time, the government was also determined to prevent 
inflation, and introduced a price stabilisation scheme. As Britain increased the prices for meat, 
the New Zealand Government put the increases into a meat industry reserve account, whilst 
keeping payments to farmers at the level of prices in place in December 1942.10 By 1949, that 
reserve had reached £29 million (more than NZ$2 billion in 2017 values); it could be spent by 
the Meat Board only with the agreement of the minister of agriculture. 
The first Meat Board comprised five representatives of meat producers and two 
representatives of the government. Provision was also made for a representative chosen by 
stock and station agents, but the first representative proposed by the agents was overly critical 
of the board and rejected by the government; the agents refused to propose an alternative.11 
Representatives of the producers were elected not directly by producers but by an electoral 
college of, at first, 6 members and, later, 25 members, the college members being elected on a 
district by district basis by producers. The electoral college system was partly a consequence 
of the way in which the negotiations to confirm details of the board had been carried out; rather 
than negotiations in a full meeting of 140 representatives of producers a smaller group had been 
selected.12 Before it merged with other farmers’ organisations to become Federated Farmers at 
the end of 1945, the Farmers’ Union wanted direct elections for board members, but lacked 
support from the board and the government.13 Farmers were especially critical at that time of 
the “paucity of information issued by the board and the secretive nature of its deliberations.”14 
That plea for a change in election of board members surfaced regularly but was always 
successfully defended by the board.15 The board supported producer control but kept itself 
distant from producers. 
Bartley reports that the board’s first chairman claimed that the electoral-college system 
meant that board members were chosen by those taking the national interest into account rather 
than regional issues.16 Bartley also suggests that because the board would have to make 
decisions which compromised farmer interests in favour of other sectors of the industry, a 
degree of isolation from direct control by all farmers was thought necessary.17 He suggests that 
the decision to use the electoral-college system rather than direct elections isolated the board 
from producers and reduced accountability.18 According to Bartley the board became “an old 
boys club” in which members were frequently returned unopposed, with only small percentages 
of producers actually taking part in elections for the electoral college.19 Phillip Herman agrees 
with Bartley, claiming that the Electoral College arrangement led to “accountability … far 
removed from … those whose interests that system had been designed to serve.”20  
This paper investigates the period after World War II, when the board was at its most 
powerful through having access to the considerable resources of the Reserve and a guaranteed 
market through continuance of wartime bulk purchase by Britain, asking whether the board 
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had become detached from producers, and whether its policy of producer control no longer 
operated in favour of producers. 
 
Meat Board Relations with Producers in the 1940s 
In September 1945 only 46 per cent of farmers voted in the Electoral College elections, and 
that led the Meat Board to complain about the “apathetic attitude of farmers.” If farmers did 
not take “a more active role in conducting their own affairs that privilege might be taken away 
from them.”21 But Federated Farmers claimed that it was the electoral arrangements that led to 
that apathy: 
the college system protects a gross betrayal of the producers’ interests. The chain of 
responsibility to the individual farmer-voter is so long and so involved, little can be 
done to sheet home the responsibilities of Board members. The archaic, cumbersome 
and undemocratic college system gives all the protection needed in just such a case. 
The Board can … gracefully climb out of the trouble which should beset it. It must, 
therefore, be happy in the isolation of its sheltered position, as immune from direct 
criticism.22  
 
How producer control worked out in practice for the Meat Board is illustrated by the debate 
during the 1940s and 1950s over ownership of freezing works. The Meat Board and Federated 
Farmers policy was that ownership should be by New Zealand farmers in cooperative 
organisations. At the start of 1940 about one-quarter of freezing factories were farmers’ 
cooperatives, half were proprietary companies with shares held by farmers, and one-quarter 
were owned by overseas companies (Table 1). But many New Zealand-owned companies had 
contractual arrangements with specific overseas companies as buyers, giving the overseas 
companies strong influence (Table 1). Curtis concludes that the board’s policy of resisting 
overseas control of freezing companies made New Zealand-owned companies subcontractors 
to the overseas companies.23 Through those arrangements the overseas companies controlled, 
at the end of World War II, 80 per cent of meat exports from the North Island and about half 
the exports from the South Island.24  
 The board and Federated Farmers justified attempts to stop overseas ownership of 
freezing factories growing through the mantra of “producer control.” Dai Hayward describes 
that policy at the moment of the formation of the board in the 1920s thus: 
Overseas meat interests have, rightly or wrongly, been regarded as the bogey-men of 
the export meat industry. It was always accepted that competition was necessary and 
that to a degree, this was supplied by overseas companies. However, the Board feared, 
especially during its early days, that an increase of overseas control would lead to a 
monopoly and the essential competition would thus disappear…. In January1923 it 
passed this rather dramatic resolution: “That this Board will look with an unfriendly 
eye upon: (a) the purchase by overseas interests of any Freezing works in New 
Zealand, (b) the acquiring of any interest in New Zealand Freezing works by overseas 
interests, and (c) the erection of new Freezing works in New Zealand by overseas 
interests.”25 
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Table 1: Ownership of New Zealand Freezing Works at the Start of 194026 
 
Overseas-
owned 
Owned by 
proprietary 
companies 
with New 
Zealand 
majority 
shareholders 
Owned by 
proprietary 
companies with 
New Zealand 
majority 
shareholders but 
with contractual 
arrangements to 
sell to specific 
overseas companies 
Owned by 
farmer 
cooperatives 
Owned by 
farmer 
cooperatives 
with contractual 
arrangements to 
sell to specific 
overseas 
companies 
Waitara Belfast Mataura Wairoa Kaiapoi 
Waingawa Fairton Finegand  Patea 
Fielding Pareora Morewa  Pukeuri 
Canterbury Petone Southdown   
Ngahauranga Shortland Horotiu   
Ocean Beach Eltham Tokumaru   
Westfield Longburn Kaiti (1/2 share)   
Tomoana Nelson Whakatu   
Kaiti (1/2 share) Castlecliff    
 Imlay    
 Picton    
 Islington    
 Smithfield    
 Burnside    
 
 
 
Towards the end of, and just after, World War II, overseas ownership of freezing works 
was increasing. Up to 1944, the freezing works at Tokomaru Bay had been a cooperative 
venture amongst local farmers, but the works were sold in 1944 to the overseas company 
Borthwick and Sons. Also in 1944, the Ocean Bay works in Southland was taken over (from a 
New Zealander living in London) by an overseas company, much to the dismay of the Farmers 
Union.27 The Union criticised the Meat Board, which it said had been “created to see that 
[producer] cooperative works continued,” and should have had the “forethought” to prevent 
the sale.28 Board members were criticised for talking about cooperative ownership of freezing 
works whilst allowing the “sale of farmers’ works to overseas interests.” The article wanted to 
“dispose” of the board members, but claimed that that was not possible because through the 
electoral-college system members were selected to represent a district and not because of their 
views on overseas sales. The article saw this as giving the board members “immunity from 
chastisement.” 
Two months later, the farming magazine Straight Furrow gave space for one of the 
farmers who had sold the Tokomaru works to explain the situation.29 He claimed that the works 
had been run at a loss for years because there was insufficient stock in the area; that loss had 
been subsidised by charging high prices at another local works at Kaiti. By selling Tokomaru 
the charges to farmers at Kaiti would be less. Also, there had been fears that the works at 
Tokomaru would close altogether, inconveniencing those local farmers who had used it. The 
farmer reported that “Expressions of opinion” by local farmers on the sale “have all been 
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favourable.” Farmers did not support the board policy of producer control when their incomes 
were threatened.  
In February 1945, the prime minister favoured renewing the lease of the freezing works 
at Ngahauranga for the American company Swift. The new lease was to be without the 
condition of the previous lease that prevented Swift from acquiring shares in the Wellington 
Meat Exporters Company (WMEC), the actual owner of the works. The board met the prime 
minister making it clear that it opposed foreign ownership and favoured ownership by New 
Zealand producers.30 The board’s power in approving licences for meat exporters enabled it to 
confirm its policy of producer control by refusing to approve a new licence for Swift. The board 
“decided to approach the farmers’ organizations to see whether they desire to offer an 
alternative proposition along the lines of the works being acquired by farmers.” Specifically, 
the board wanted farmers local to the freezing works to invest in a farmers’ cooperative to take 
over the works.31 
At its meeting in May 1945, the board could report that there was a desire to form a 
farmers’ cooperative, and the board proposed that two-thirds of the initial capital be provided 
from the Meat Reserve fund. But legal advice was that the conditions imposed on the use of 
those funds meant members of the new company had to secure guarantees of an “adequate 
supply of fat-stock to permit economical operation” for not less than ten years.32 In July 1945, 
the general manager of the board reported that farmers were “not generally favourable to 
signing any document” giving such a guarantee because there was uncertainty over both the 
cost of reconditioning the works and future ownership of the works.33 In August 1945, the 
Farmers’ Union confirmed that, though it favoured the cooperative system of ownership, the 
uncertainty about the value of the works and the cost of restoration made it impossible to obtain 
the essential guarantee of fat-stock.34 The Meat Board general manager gave his interpretation 
of why a guarantee by farmers had not been secured:  
Unfortunately, in the southern part of the North Island there were many graveyards 
of farmers’ money which had been put into producer-owned freezing works in the 
past and little enthusiasm could be stimulated in the new proposals.35 
 
The board decided to ask the government to allow the board to use the meat reserve to purchase 
the works “if there is no other way to prevent the ownership from passing to an overseas 
firm.”36 The government refused, and decided that it would lease the company to Swift as 
planned, thereby allowing Swift to purchase the WMEC and acquire ownership of the works. 
The government had faced diplomatic pressure from the USA in support of Swift and had to 
keep a careful balance between New Zealand export interests and the need for American 
support during the trade negotiations that followed World War II.37 The board recorded its 
objection but had to accept the situation, partly fearing that its right of approving licences would 
be taken over by the government.38  
What emerges from the Ngahauranga case is that farmers recognised that producer 
control carried with it producer risk; individual farmers rejected producer control if it carried 
financial risk for themselves, they preferred to see the Meat Board or government, or even an 
overseas-owned company, taking that risk.  
 
The Freezing Industry in Southland 
A specific case study that demonstrates how producer control worked out for the Meat Board, 
Federated Farmers, the government and farmers, is the introduction of much-needed processing 
facilities in Southland.39 That introduction was delayed for a decade mainly because the Meat 
Board insisted on a policy of producer control even though that policy operated against the 
wishes of Southland producers and was to their detriment. It serves well as a case study because 
Clive Lind, using Alliance Freezing Company papers together with interviews with those 
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associated with the Company, has described developments from the company’s point of view 
during the long delay. This paper focuses on developments as seen by the Meat Board, 
Federated Farmers (at national and provincial levels) and the government. Lessons learnt are 
that a mantra such as producer control can become too rigid, especially when a strong, 
opinionated personality leads a board that had become detached from farmers; the board may 
actually act against producer interests.  
There had been long-term dissatisfaction with the meat processing facilities in 
Southland. Farmers claimed that from 1938 “congestion and the lack of facilities was extremely 
difficult and chaotic.”40 Two processing and marketing companies operated in Southland, the 
Southland Frozen Meat Company (SFMC) and the Ocean Beach Freezing Company, the 
former being by far the most influential. Both were proprietary companies rather than 
cooperatives, SFMC being owned mainly by farmers and Ocean Beach by a New Zealander 
(Arthur Sims) who was living in London. The companies operated joint agreements to control 
their throughput in the companies’ interests rather than farmers.41 When Mr K. W. J. Hall 
addressed the North Canterbury executive of the Farmers Union in 1943 warning of the 
influence of overseas companies, he was asked if that meant New Zealand companies in the 
South Island were working for farmers. He replied: 
No, I wouldn’t go as far as that. But while their shareholders include local farmers I 
think they tend to be more sympathetic to our interests. 
  
Facilities in Southland compared unfavourably with those in other parts of New Zealand 
(Table 2): the ratio of annual killings to daily capacity being double that of Auckland and 50 
per cent more than that in Hawke’s Bay. Also, in Southland, the killings were compressed into 
a shorter killing season. Fat-stock producers had to adopt farming practices to fit in with the 
timetables set unilaterally by the companies, instead of the companies setting the timetables to 
fit in with good farming practice. A group of Southland farmers decided that they should invest 
in a new works under their own control. 
 
Table 2: Killing Capacities and Annual Killings for Auckland, Hawke's Bay and 
Southland in 1950 
 
District Daily Capacity for killings Annual Killings 
Auckland 47,000 2,322,994 
Hawke's Bay 26,000 1,715,598 
Southland 25,000 2,309,601 
 
 
Gilbert Grigg, the Meat Board chairman, and other representatives of the board, met the 
disgruntled farmers in Invercargill to discuss the proposal for a new works, expected to be run 
“either by a farmer cooperative company or by a proprietary company with capital provided by 
farmers on a 50–50 basis.”42 At that March 1946 meeting, Grigg suggested the formation of a 
company in which shares would be held by farmers. Another Meat Board member stated that 
the type of company to operate the works should be left entirely for the farmer to decide.43 But 
farmers were warned against a purely farmers’ company.44 Lind reports that the Meat Board 
representatives warned the farmers that the proposed cooperative works would have “to run the 
gauntlet of competition.”45 The President of Southland Federated Farmers reported in 1952 that 
the advice given by the Meat Board at that meeting in 1945 was: 
not to attempt to run a works as a purely farmers’ company, but to do so with a strong 
partner. Otherwise, in bad times … there would be nobody to support the works, as 
there would be no important buyer with any financial reason for doing so. It was 
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emphasised that a buying partner with a financial interest in the works would be bound 
to protect the capital invested by supporting the works in all circumstances.46 
 
In August 1946, the board received a letter from Southland Federated Farmers stating 
that the Federation had approved a proprietary company to apply for a licence to set up a new 
freezing works in Southland. Also, that Borthwick and Sons and the Canterbury Frozen Meat 
Company had been asked “if they would be prepared, under certain conditions, to apply for a 
license for the erection of a new works in the district.”47 In November 1946, Southland 
Federated Farmers asked whether or not the Meat Board would recommend the granting of a 
licence. The board’s response was that it would not “give a decision until complete information 
regarding ownership was available.”48  
In January 1947, the Meat Board sought stronger control over the sale of freezing works 
throughout New Zealand, and requested that the government amend the Meat Act so that any 
freezing company wishing to sell works in New Zealand had to obtain the board’s permission.49 
The final version of the amendment was that permission had to be obtained either from the 
minister or from the Meat Board acting with the authority of the minister; the government 
remained adamant that it would not let the board have a veto over sales of freezing works.50 
At its August 1947 meeting, the board received a “lengthy submission from Southland 
Federated Farmers in support of a request for a new licence,” and the board agreed “to support 
an application for a new licence by applicants approved by the board.”51 A Southland Sheep-
Farmers Company had been formed to set up new works. The board representatives had 
anticipated that “the strong partner, someone established in the meat industry with practical 
know-how of operations of a works,” would be an existing company such as the SFMC or the 
Canterbury Freezing Company. But Southland farmers had investigated those possibilities and 
been rebuffed.52 Three months later, the board was taken aback when it was read a letter from 
the minister noting that the Southland Sheep-Farmers Company intended to join in a 50–50 
partnership with the overseas-owned W. & R. Fletcher (NZ) Ltd to form the Alliance Freezing 
Company (Southland) Ltd, with the intention to erect a new slaughterhouse.53 That was counter 
to the expectations of the board and would introduce the foreign ownership that the board had 
sought to avoid, Fletcher was owned by the major UK company Vesteys. The President of 
Southland Federated Farmers justified the decision to join forces with Fletcher; farmers would 
have a 
strong partner with a wide and lengthy experience in the erection and operation of 
freezing works, and processing and production standards of both the meat and the 
byproducts which are the highest in the Dominion. Also with an unrivalled worldwide 
selling organisation. We also have a guaranteed throughput sufficient to assure the 
financial success of the company.54 
 
The minister asked the board to recommend granting a licence and erecting new works 
but the board refused, telling the minister that Fletchers already had “the largest share of New 
Zealand’s Meat Export Trade…. It was not in the interest of Producers for this concern to 
obtain any greater hold.”55 But the board refused to give reasons for the rejection to those 
representing Alliance. The board considered that keeping to a national principle of producer 
control outweighed the interests of the local producers in solving their difficulties. Federated 
Farmers, nationally, shared the doubts over the proposed arrangement with Fletchers; for 
instance, farmers would get only “what was left after the proprietary company had taken its 
share,” and farmers might sell their shares, thereby reducing producer control of the venture.56 
In March 1948, Grigg and his general manager visited Federated Farmers in Southland 
to explore possible compromises, but hurriedly had to issue a press notice to correct “the 
incorrect impression in the minds of many farmers” that the board supported the proposal for 
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new works involving Fletchers. The board reiterated that “there shall be no increase in overseas 
ownership or control of freezing works in New Zealand.”57 At its June 1948 meeting, the Meat 
Board met those representing Alliance, including a representative from Fletchers, and agreed 
to consider a license at its July meeting.58 During the July meeting, the board, with John (later 
Sir John) Ormond as acting chairman, prevaricated, deciding “to seek evidence from interested 
parties” and hear “oral amplification of written submissions” at its August meeting.59 In 
October, the board considered again a request from the minister that the board recommend 
granting a licence to Alliance; the board again rejected the application, and also refused to tell 
the minister why the licence was rejected.  
In April 1949, the dominion president of Federated Farmers gave his opinion on what 
should be done in Southland, and demonstrated the uncertainty within Federated Farmers over 
recognising the obvious need in Southland but not wanting to go against the policy of restricting 
foreign ownership. He said that it was essential that a “new element” should be introduced in 
Southland but “the form of the new element … is a matter between Southland producers, the 
Meat Board and the government … but something must be done.”60 In August 1949, the board, 
caught between wanting to see a farmers-owned freezing works but fearing that meant overseas 
involvement, came up with the compromise that the board support the Alliance farmers in 
purchasing one of the existing SFMC works, that at Mataura.61 But farmers still sought their 
own new works, partly because a new works would incorporate modern technology. The 
frustrated farmers petitioned Parliament seeking an amendment to the Meat Act that would 
remove the Meat Board’s veto over the ministerial approval of export licences to new 
organisations. The petition pointed out that increasing the facilities in Southland was “of 
paramount importance to assist the Dominion of New Zealand in honouring its obligation to 
increase supplies to the United Kingdom,” an obligation New Zealand failed to honour.62 
Parliament set up a committee to investigate the circumstances, and that committee criticised 
the Meat Board for refusing to give the minister reasons why it refused Alliance a license; the 
board, it said, should not make the minister “subservient to the Board.”63 The committee 
chairman suggested the time had come when there should be a different arrangement for 
electing Meat Board members so that there would be a “closer bond between the board and 
producers.” But the committee made no recommendation on the request for a license for 
Alliance, and supported the policy of preventing any extension of overseas ownership. The 
Minister of Finance expressed the dilemma on overseas ownership, saying it was a “menace” 
for overseas companies to have the major controlling interest but “it was well that outsiders 
should assist farmers with their skill and knowledge.”64  
During the general election campaign of 1949, Southland farmers secured a statement 
from the leader of the National Party, Sidney Holland, that:  
If the National Party becomes the Government at the approaching election, it will be 
prepared, at the conclusion of the coming killing season, to set up a commission of 
inquiry into the question of the establishment of an additional freezing works in 
Southland, it being understood, as was agreed when I met the deputation in 
Invercargill, that the finding of the proposed tribunal would be accepted as final.65  
 
In November 1949, the National Party was elected to government, replacing the Labour 
Government of the previous 14 years. The Southland section of Federated Farmers went against 
the prevarication among Federated Farmers national leaders and stated unequivocally that a 
license should be granted immediately to Alliance.66 The new government kept Holland’s 
commitment, and decided that the question of ownership of Freezing works in Southland was 
of sufficient interest nationally that a Royal Commission should investigate “the desirability of 
establishing an additional meat export slaughterhouse in Southland”.67  
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The Influence of John Ormond 
Lind reports that Alliance were dealing with John Ormond, who “usually got what he 
wanted.”68 Ormond was a determined advocate of the Meat Board policy on ownership of 
freezing plants, and from the late 1940s the Meat Board approach was a reflection of Ormond’s 
intransigent nature. Ormond grew up in a family whose position resembled the landed gentry 
in Britain. His family had become established in New Zealand in the middle of the nineteenth 
century, and his grandfather played a major role in the development of the Hawke’s Bay region, 
representing the region in the House of Representatives and being appointed to the Legislative 
Council on retirement from the House. Ormond at first tried to follow his grandfather into 
politics, and during the 1930s was a leading proponent of the New Zealand Legion, a radical, 
extreme right-wing party, in which he hoped to play a leading role.69 When it became clear that 
the Legion would not grow into a significant party, Ormond stood as a National candidate for 
election to Parliament in 1935. The local press reported that “round the name of Ormond there 
is an allure that will win hundreds of votes in a farming constituency.”70 His approach at the 
time demonstrated his intransigent manner. His election posters told voters that “he is 
convinced that efficient government necessitates more independent expression of opinion by 
members.” He supported National, but “will not necessarily vote with the party but with 
discretion.”71 Ormond was unsuccessful in gaining election, partly because he could not 
commit himself to a political party in which he did not have a dominant role. Becoming a 
member of the Meat Board allowed him to play a dominant role unencumbered by the threat 
of deselection. 
Ormond first became a member of the Meat Board in 1933−34 and resigned to fight 
overseas during World War II, rejoining the board in 1944 after returning to New Zealand 
following an injury during the battle for Crete. He became deputy chairman of the board in the 
late 1940s and chairman from 1951 until 1972. One justification offered to him for the 
invitation to be the chairman was “You are one of the offspring of one of the most honoured 
families in New Zealand.”72 His role as Meat Board chairman gave him far more influence 
over New Zealand governments than he would have had as a member of parliament; certainly, 
at least, Ormond saw it that way. At one meeting he told Robert Muldoon, then finance 
minister, “sit down, Muldoon, sit down. You do not control this country, Jack Acland 
[chairman of the Wool Board and Ormond’s brother-in-law] and I control this country.”73 
Ormond would have disagreed vehemently with the parliamentary committee’s comment in 
1949 that the Meat Board should not make the minister subservient to the board. 
Ormond established a strong working relationship with Keith Holyoake, who was 
minister of agriculture in the 1950s and prime minister in the 1960s; both shared mutual 
respect, though disagreeing on many occasions.74 Ormond also built up a strong relationship 
with Fintan Patrick Walsh, a key figure in labour relations in the 1940s and 1950s through his 
control of the Federation of Labour. Ormond and Walsh did not share political views but had 
common interests through being mavericks in their respective fields, preferring to settle matters 
over drinks rather than at formal meetings. According to his biographer, “Walsh got on 
particularly well with the hard-drinking Ormond.”75 According to Ormond’s biographer, 
“despite their differing roles and background, the two men soon built up a rapport.”76 
Ormond’s maverick nature secured his long-term support from farmers, because he was 
a strong well-publicised leader who stood up to government in both New Zealand and Britain. 
Ormond’s brusque, outspoken manner and determination made him effective with both the 
media and politicians. He was not skilled at reasoned debate, but was an early example of 
politicians who push their argument through the media rather than statutory bodies.77 Barry 
Gustafson’s comments on Robert Muldoon were appropriate for Ormond: he “asserted rather 
than explained the positions he took,” and “he speaks in newspaper headlines.”78 Peter Tait, in 
his biography of Ormond, reports that Ormond “fully realised the value as a farmer politician 
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of keeping his name to the fore” and he “did his best to ensure that he was not only available 
to the press, but that he was good copy.”79 One prime example of his approach was that in 
1951, just before becoming board chairman, he said in an interview with the Press Association 
that “it’s time we twisted the lion’s tail,” referring to upcoming price negotiations with Britain. 
Many were horrified at the disrespect shown to Britain, but when the New Zealand delegation, 
led by Holyoake, returned from the price negotiations with New Zealand having achieved a 12 
per cent increase, Ormond was given the credit. That episode cemented Ormond’s reputation 
amongst rank and file farmers as someone who spoke in their language. From 1950, the 
Alliance farmers were faced with a powerful and intransigent opponent. 
 
Report of the Royal Commission 
The Royal Commission reported in 1951, and found the concern of Southland farmers to be 
fully justified: 
The detailed evidence of the large number of Southland fat-stock producers was not 
seriously shaken by close and competent cross-examination; nor was it traversed by 
evidence called on behalf of the Meat Board or of the freezing-works companies. The 
Commission is satisfied that most of the farmers of the district sincerely and honestly 
believe that the freezing-works companies have run their businesses solely in their 
own interests, with the result that the fat-stock producers have had to adopt farming 
practices to fit in with the timetables set unilaterally by the companies, instead of the 
companies setting the timetables to fit in with good farming practice. 
 
There are, of course, two sides to this question, but if the companies had made an 
endeavour to meet the executive of Federated Farmers with a view to minimizing any 
problems which could not be adjusted or resolved wholly, the differences, 
misunderstandings, and ill feeling … might not have developed to a state which could 
fairly be described as “tragic.” The blame for allowing the breach between the two 
interests to develop in the way it has must, in the Commission’s opinion, rest upon 
the companies.80 
 
The commission had no doubt that the projected fat lamb production in Southland needed new 
works. Export killings had doubled in the previous 15 years (Table 3); the commission expected 
that rate of increase to continue.81 Ten per cent of the killings were already taking place by 
transporting lambs outside Southland because of the lack of local facilities. The commission 
accepted that the actions and persistence of the farmers in pressing for a new company were 
fully justified.82 The commission decided that “Federated Farmers … is one of the most 
powerful, influential and useful organisations in the country” and is “able to afford strong 
protection against any scheme or policy which might prevent a farmer reaping the full reward 
of his labour.”83 The board had always claimed that protection of producers had been its major 
objective; the commission had decided that Federated Farmers was the more effective of the 
two organisations in achieving that objective. The commission’s findings were a further 
indication that the board had become divorced from producers and at times acted against the 
interests of producers. 
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Table 3: Total Killings of Sheep and Lambs in Southland, 1935-1950 
 
Year 
Total Killings of Sheep and 
Lambs 
1935 1,185,733 
1936 1,211,303 
1937 1,132,361 
1938 1,300,314 
1939 1,392,248 
1940 1,602,550 
1941 1,692,105 
1942 1,709,158 
1943 1,635,630 
1944 1,612,922 
1945 1,717,060 
1946 1,837,790 
1947 1,952,147 
1948 2,024,464 
1949 2,117,810 
1950 2,309,601 
 
 
The specific criticism of the board by the Royal Commission was that its policy of 
refusing a licence for a company in which any overseas concern had a substantial interest “may 
operate against the public interest.”84 The board was also criticised for not explaining to 
Alliance why the board refused to grant a licence. The Meat Board’s weak responses to the 
commission’s questioning is demonstrated by Grigg’s responses. He had told the commission 
that “the fact that Fletchers was a partner in the company was not the reason for refusing the 
application.” Earlier, however, he had admitted that granting a licence in which a half share 
was to be held by Fletchers would be contrary to the board’s policy.85 The board’s position was 
further weakened because, in the period leading up to the commission, the board, to procure a 
meat distribution company in Britain, went into minority partnership with the overseas meat 
companies that it was opposing, in terms of their increasing ownership of freezing works in 
New Zealand. The board was criticised by Federated Farmers because the arrangement would 
not give producers’ control of meat distribution in what was, by far, New Zealand’s main export 
market.86 
The Royal Commission considered that “a statutory body like the Board constituted to 
carry out its functions in the public interest should not adopt a policy which may result in unfair 
discrimination, unless such a policy is specifically authorised by statute.” The commission 
recognised that the board’s policy was because of the “long-standing fear of New Zealand 
farmers of exploitation by powerful overseas companies.” Nonetheless, the Meat Export 
Control Act of 1921 and the Meat Act of 1939 had given “great protection to the fat stock 
producer.” Continued prejudice against the expansion of British meat companies in New 
Zealand “might not be in the best interests of Commonwealth relations.” The commission 
recommended that the Meat Act “be amended to define those matters which the board must 
consider before making a recommendation on a new licence.”87  
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Continuing Attempts to Prevent Alliance from Building a New Freezing Works 
At its September 1951 meeting, the first with Ormond as chairman, the board “completely and 
unreservedly accepted the opinion of the Royal Commission,” but postponed a decision on the 
license for Alliance.88 One month later, the board decided that it would continue to refuse to 
recommend a licence for Alliance. But the board would:  
negotiate immediately with the farmers of Southland for the purpose of facilitating 
the erection of such a works and, subject to the approval of the Government, make 
available for that purpose substantial financial assets from the Meat Industry Reserve 
Account.89  
 
Straight Furrow warned that “if the shareholders of the Alliance company did not agree with 
such an idea en bloc the board would probably negotiate with those who were prepared to enter 
the new scheme and provide a reasonable amount of capital.”90 Ormond and his board began 
manoeuvring to outflank the Alliance group of farmers. 
Ormond gave a formal response to the commission’s findings to the Federated Farmers 
meat and wool section two months after the commission had reported:  
The policy which my Board has recommended to the Government in connection with 
the proposed Southland works is that this works, and all other works[,] … shall be a 
farmer-owned, preferably cooperative, processing works…. Such a policy eliminates 
difficulties of deciding between overseas and New Zealand interests in the freezing 
industry and ensures that there is no interference with any trading operations in New 
Zealand…. The Board was concerned that decisions had been made in the past that 
were merely expedient. It would endeavour to see that this did not happen again and 
to this end, laid down a definite principle which could be accepted as policy and 
precedent for the future. We can see no other way of dealing with the ownership of 
what are really monopolies … and at the same time ensuring that there is open and 
fair competition. We trust that farmers will give us their wholehearted support and 
that this policy and our action will be endorsed by the Government.91  
 
Following the damning, for the Meat Board, conclusions of the Royal Commission, the 
board had to accept the need for a new works, but, without informing Alliance farmers, started 
consultations with the minority of Southland farmers outside the Alliance group on forming a 
“farmer-owned, preferably cooperative” organisation supported by a loan of £2.5 million at 1 
per cent interest from the meat industry reserve account. The government agreed that the Meat 
Board should go ahead and canvass the non-Alliance Southland farmers, setting a deadline of 
31 March 1952 for agreement to be reached that the farmers would contribute sufficient capital 
in support of the new works.92 The Southland Federated Farmers president pointed out that “a 
purely farmers’ company is contrary to the advice given by the Meat Board itself in 1946…. 
Who is going to supply a purely producers’ concern with the technical and administrative skills 
needed to operate the complicated business of a freezing works in these difficult times?.”93 He 
pointed out also that “the people conducting the canvass have not approached Federated 
Farmers [in Southland]. They have gone behind our backs to a very small minority.”94 The 
minister for agriculture, Keith Holyoake, reported to the Meat Board that the government “had 
grave doubts about spending producer funds” on a farmer-controlled works given the past 
history of such ventures.95 
Attempts to gain support for the new company from Southland farmers other than those 
committed to Alliance continued through 1952, with the government extending the original 
deadline. But, by November 1952, the government decided that the conditions had not been 
met and a licence should be given to Alliance. In the government’s view, the company put 
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together by the Meat Board should go into liquidation. It had only reached the target for 
subscriptions to shareholding by a latecomer from outside Southland agreeing to subscribe to 
nearly half the necessary shares provided his shares were “disposed of” within six months. But 
the Meat Board (Ormond?), not wanting to admit defeat, once again refused to recommend a 
license for Alliance, and asked that Alliance and the board’s favoured company should “get 
together and evolve a mutually satisfactory basis” for a new works.96 Holyoake called a 
meeting of the Meat Board and the two companies “in an endeavour to secure some 
agreement.”97 Federated Farmers nationally continued in its weak position of sitting on the 
fence—supporting the policy of not wanting to see overseas ownership increased, but opting 
not to comment on whether a license for Alliance should be agreed. It distributed a note seeking 
provinces to support the policy of no increased overseas ownership; the Southland province 
objected, claiming that the contents of the note were misleading and not a correct statement of 
facts.98 
Three years after the Royal Commission had reported, the board still opposed granting a 
licence to Alliance.99 But Alliance refused to give in, and the board had to resign itself to 
supporting Alliance and accepted that the new works should be run as a farmer shareholder 
concern by Alliance rather than a cooperative. Dai Hayward, in his adulatory book celebrating 
the first fifty years of the board, reports this acceptance as the board finding that “participation 
by local producers [in a farmers’ cooperative] was proving difficult to obtain.”100 He does not 
mention that it took the board more than a decade to accept that. It was not until the late 1950s 
that the board accepted the reality, supporting the venture with a loan of £4 million out of the 
meat industry reserve account at a low interest rate (1 per cent) with the condition that Fletcher 
withdraw from shared ownership. A face-saving arrangement for the board was achieved: 
Fletcher withdrew from shared ownership, accepting that that was the only way Alliance could 
succeed, but Fletcher maintained a close relationship by agreeing to “maintain a buying 
organisation in Southland and will undertake … to protect the works volume by killing a 
minimum of 300,000 head during any season.” Ormond later claimed that he had persuaded, 
over a cigar and whiskey, the head of Vesteys in Britain that Fletcher should withdraw.101 The 
new works was opened (by Ormond!) in March 1960, incorporating “the most modern 
techniques and developments in meat-killing and exporting” and amply demonstrated that it 
met a need in Southland.102 
 
Conclusion 
The Meat Board’s intransigence over ownership of freezing works demonstrates that the board 
exerted a conservative drag on increasing the efficiency of the New Zealand Meat industry 
after World War II. The board had been created, and saw itself, as the protector of producers—
its broadcasted, overriding, policy over many years was “to increase the net return to 
producers.” It had no commitment to aid the rest of the industry, such as brokers, buyers, or 
freezing companies, even though those were essential for the sale of producers’ meat. The 
board recognised a duty to support those bodies only if they were producer cooperatives. Even 
if they were proprietary companies with farmer shareholders the board viewed them with 
suspicion, partly because there was always a threat that shares would be sold to non-producers 
and, at its worst, overseas interests. The board had adopted producer control as a policy, but it 
was not in the chairman’s nature to review whether that was always in the best interest of 
producers. Producer control often meant producer financial risk; many farmers struggling to 
secure sufficient returns to invest in their farms were reluctant to take that risk. Southland 
farmers were prepared to take financial risk in partnership with Fletcher, but the board opposed 
that for more than a decade. An independent view was given by the Royal Commission that 
the board acted against the public interest. The board tried hard to prevent Alliance setting up 
a new works and only grudgingly accepted that after more than a decade of manoeuvring 
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against the Southland producers. The whole episode justifies the conclusions of Bartley and 
Herman that the board’s accountability was weakened by the electoral system and that lack of 
accountability could be well exploited by an intransigent chairman immune from chastisement. 
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